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Abstract— In the future, the United States government can seek to limit 
the ownership and usage of cyber weapons. The question is whether 
the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution gives a right 
to bear and own military-grade cyber weapons, and if so, under which 
conditions. The framers of the Bill of Rights, ratified in 1791, did not 
limit the right to bear arms to defined weapons such as long rifles and 
pistols, but instead chose the broader word arms. The United States 
Supreme Court, in the case District of Columbia v. Heller, upheld a 
demarcation between “dangerous and unusual” weapons that are not 
permissible to own and weapons protected by the Second Amendment. 
Cyber weapons take the form of dual-use software, often shared and 
globally distributed, that in most cases can be weaponized for harmful 
purposes. In recent years, major corporations have sought to “hack 
back,”and if the hack back is authorized, the question becomes 
whether corporations have digital gun rights. Even if corporations are 
considered US persons, they do not automatically obtain digital gun 
rights based on the Second Amendment. This article discusses the core 
constitutional challenges for the United States government in 
prohibiting individual ownership of cyber weapons and the rationale 
for why corporations are in a weaker position regarding ownership of 
cyber arms. The argument brought forward is that individuals can 
claim Second Amendment protection of their right to own military-
grade software tools, but corporations must meet additional criteria to 
do so.   
Keywords – penetration testing, malware, port scanners, cyber 
weapons, Second Amendment, cyber arms, network scanning 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If the US government pursued the regulation of cyber 
weapons and the prohibition of private ownership of these arms, 
the question becomes if and how the right to bear arms would 
protect ownership of cyber weapons from governmental 
intervention. Another question is whether the Second 
Amendment to the US Constitution provides individuals and 
corporations with equal protection regarding the right to own 
advanced cyber weapons. In most cases, public debate over the 
Second Amendment is ideological, but there also is legal 
doctrine given by the US Supreme Court in the verdict of 
District of Columbia v. Heller that culminates the aggregation 
of precedent covering more than two centuries.   
The Second Amendment to the US Constitution, ratified 
1791, was not only a product of the American Revolution and 
recognition of the state militias’ contribution to the war effort, 
but also was an idea nurtured by early influencers of the 
Founding Fathers [1],[2]. A hundred years before the American 
Revolution, Hobbes declared that the right to bear arms was a 
response to the lingering chaos of human conflict and without 
access to weapons, society would fall into a state of entropy. 
Montesquieu considered armed citizens a counter-balance to 
tyranny and the abuse of power. During the Virginia 
Convention in June 1776, when Jefferson and Mason worked to 
word the new constitution for the State of Virginia, they wrote 
that “no freeman should be debarred the use of arms.” This 
phrase did not appear in the final bill [3].   
The Second Amendment to the US Constitution reads as 
follows: “A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear 
arms, shall not be infringed.” The authors of the Bill of Rights 
and Second Amendment could have listed the weapons of their 
era, but instead used the general term, arms. Restrictions on the 
weapons that citizens have the right to bear have been 
implemented over time through litigation and guidance from the 
US Supreme Court and precedents put forth through the legal 
system.  
II. DANGEROUS AND UNUSUAL WEAPONS 
 
In the most recent legal challenge to Second Amendment 
doctrine, addressed by the US Supreme Court, a central legal 
question was what types of weapons are protected by the 
Second Amendment. If a weapon is “dangerous and unusual” 
under the US Supreme Court’s interpretation and verdict, then 
ownership of such a weapon is not protected by the Second 
Amendment to the US Constitution. If a weapon is deemed 
“dangerous and unusual,” then the government is not hindered 
by the Second Amendment to forbid ownership and usage.  
In their District of Columbia v. Heller verdict, the US 
Supreme Court majority wrote [4]: 
 
“We also recognize another important limitation on the right 
to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that 
the sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in common use at 
the time.’ 307 U. S., at 179. We think that limitation is fairly 
supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying 
of “dangerous and unusual weapons.” See 4 Blackstone 148–
149 (1769); 3 B. Wilson, Works of the Honourable James 
Wilson 79 (1804); J. Dunlap, The New-York Justice 8 (1815); 
C. Humphreys, A Compendium of the Common Law in Force 
in Kentucky 482 (1822); 1 W. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes 
  
and Indictable Misdemeanors 271–272 (1831); H. Stephen, 
Summary of the Criminal Law 48 (1840); E. Lewis, An 
Abridgment of the Criminal Law of the United States 64 (1847); 
F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United 
States 726 (1852). See also State v. Langford, 10 N. C. 381, 
383–384 (1824); O’Neill v. State, 16Ala. 65, 67 (1849); English 
v. State, 35Tex. 473, 476 (1871); State v. Lanier, 71 N. C. 288, 
289 (1874).” 
The US Supreme Court majority refer to cases that define 
unusual and dangerous weapons, and also to behaviors that 
could endanger others. In State v. Lanier (1874), a drunk man 
rides at a canter pace at midnight through a courthouse yard, 
which is considered an endangerment. The verdict of the North 
Carolina Supreme Court rejected the prosecution’s premise. 
The North Carolina Supreme Court based its decision on the 
conditions surrounding the event: “We conceive that the riding 
through a courthouse or a street at 12 o’clock at night, when no 
one is present, is a very different thing from riding through at 
12 o’clock in the day, when the courthouse or street is full of 
people.” The fact that the man rode at a canter pace through 
town at midnight was not a public endangerment and did not 
break the peace.  
In English v. State, protected arms are defined as the arms of 
a militia, which are military-grade arms.  
III.  DANGEROUS CYBERWEAPONS 
The US Supreme Court, with supporting legal precedence, 
has declared that only weapons that are not “dangerous and 
unusual” are permissible.   
The next question is what would constitute a dangerous and 
unusual cyber weapon that would preclude ownership—
including placement on computers—by citizens. First, the 
existence and effect of the weapon must be known to the 
government and the lawmaker so it could be restricted. A 
militiaman is armed with his personal armament: rifle, bayonet, 
and sidearm. In the nondigital world, as an example, claymore  
mines and hand grenades are not permissible weapons for the 
citizenry, but are considered “dangerous and unusual” and 
therefore restricted to government use. The damage and hazards 
surrounding claymore mines and hand grenades are known to 
the government and the lawmaker. The tripwire will detonate 
the claymore mine, and the hand grenade is thrown without a 
clear understanding of the final impact and effect. The mine is 
autonomous in its execution, and the grenade is not sufficiently 
accurate, with a possibility of damages beyond the intended 
scope of the defender. These effects are known to the 
government. In cyber, this decision path is different. 
 The lawmaker needs to be aware of cyberweapons and the 
means of restricting them. Otherwise, the result would be a ban 
on thought and innovation; the law would then arbitrarily 
punish what in retrospect is considered “dangerous and unusual 
cyberweapons” through law that is ex-post-facto legislation.  
 
IV. DEFINITION OF CYBER ARMS 
 
There no precise definition of cyber arms or the anticipated 
capabilities and effects of their utilization. One reason is that 
the very nature of software creates multiple purposes for 
utilization.  
The US Department of Defense has no codified, uniform 
definition, but refers to cyber arms as a “capability:” “a device, 
computer program, or technique, including any combination of 
software, firmware, or hardware, designed to create an effect in 
or through cyberspace” [5]. 
The common definition of cyber arms is broad and 
comprehensive. One definition, by the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence (CCDOE), is [6] “…software, firmware or hardware 
designed or applied to cause damage through the cyber 
domain.”  
This definition is legally problematic because of the 
assumption that the intended usage of software, firmware, or 
hardware would alter the status of a nonweapon to a weapon. 
This contradicts elementary principles in the rule of law, where 
legal rules altered after the fact are referred to as ex-post facto 
laws. The cyber community have yet not presented a commonly 
accepted definition, even if attempts have been made to define 
cyber weapons [7].  
The US Constitution specifically prohibits this in Article 1, 
Section 9: “No Bill of Attainder or ex-post facto Law shall be 
passed [8].” 
The Second Amendment does not address the intent of the 
arms owner. In 1791, the right was derived from the status of a 
citizen in the newborn union of free colonies. The military-
design, semi-automatic rifles that are protected by the Second 
Amendment and owned by citizens are primarily hunting 
rifles—in other words, a utility that could, if necessary, serve as 
a weapon of military conflict. There is a similarity between the 
gun-powder-propelled arms that are protected by the Second 
Amendment and dual-use hacking software, since the software 
is dual-use as both utility and weapon.    
V. UNUSUAL WEAPONS 
In the legal precedence [9], as exemplified by English v. 
State, 35Tex. 473, 476 (1871), Bowie-knives, slungshots, 
daggers, and brass knuckles with no military value do not bring 
Second Amendment protection to bear. In the digital realm, the 
unusual is far harder to prove for the government when the 
weaponized software is in most cases of dual use.  A computer 
user can use a port scanner to determine which ports are 
responding to calls to install a printer. Thus, the port scanner 
could be a hacking tool, but it could also be a civilian utility 
software. Networking mapping software, such as the open-
source software Nmap [10], is primarily a tool for network 
discovery. Hackers could use Nmap software to increase their 
knowledge of network topography, but Nmap is primarily a 
utility tool, not a weaponized, hacking tool. A way to weaponize 
the the tool is to cluster multiple Nmap achieve an ability to 
scan large portions of a network [11]. So the fact that clustered 
Nmap can be a weaponized tool and the single use of the 
software would give military and intelligence hackers a tool to 
do network discovery, even if never intended to be a military 
  
tool, render Nmap status as a military useful software.  This dual 
use pertains not only in civilian and military realms, but also in 
the multiple purposes of cyberweapons as a weaponized 
software, and a networking utility undermines government 
support for framing a hacker tool as an “unusual” weapon [12]. 
If used by the defense establishment and the intelligence 
community a claim that it is an “unusual weapon” is nullified, 
because government through actions have evidence that it is a 
“usual weapon”. Because hacker and discovery tools are 
commonly used by both the military and civilians, both 
communities utilize the same over-arching information 
technology such as wireless, sharing, data storage, Internet of 
Things, and communication [13],[14], the legal foundation for 
prohibiting civilian ownership of potentially weaponized 
software evaporates.       
     
VI. CORPORATE CYBER RIGHTS TO BEAR ARMS 
 
In the originalist thought, militiamen were volunteers ready 
to defend their state and community from hostile forces, and by 
doing so, risked their lives in the engagement. The militia is 
made up of citizens of the state that have the right to bear arms. 
A militia risks the lives of its members to defend its community 
and state. Therefore, sui genesis a militia is mortal: a militiaman 
could die from combat wounds or succumb to disease and 
hardship as a result of combat.  
The relationship between the militia, armed citizens, and 
lawmakers is a social contract where all parties surrender and 
receive. Citizens have the right to bear arms, but citizens are 
assumed to be reasonable—what in Roman legal tradition are 
described as bonus pater familias: the reasonable good 
family—a father with sound judgment and values who will 
provide security when needed and defend his community. In the 
originalist view, the militia is presumed loyal to the state that 
emerged after the American Revolution. The Bill of Rights was 
ratified 1791, less than 10 years after the end of the American 
Revolutionary War, which divided the colonists of the 13 
colonies into two camps: American revolutionaries and 
loyalists to the King of England. The militia gives the state 
manpower to protect the people of the state and the state itself 
if needed, surrender their freedom partly by volunteering as 
militiamen and accepting a risk of loss of life, and gain a right 
to bear arms. Each citizen that who is given the right to bear 
arms does not need to be a member of the militia to execute and 
take favor of the right to bear arms, but the militia is recruited 
from the armed citizenry.       
Federal US law establishes that a corporation is a US person 
under federal laws and executive orders. The US tax code 
Internal Revenue Code Section 7701(a)(30) defines a US 
person as “a citizen or resident of the United States (including 
a lawful permanent resident residing abroad who has not 
formally notified the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services in order to abandon that status); a domestic 
partnership; a domestic corporation.” The National Security 
Agency, supported by US Presidential Executive Order 12333, 
states the following: “Federal law and executive order define a 
US person as a citizen of the United States; an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence; an unincorporated 
association with a substantial number of members who are 
citizens of the U.S. or are aliens lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence; or, a corporation that is incorporated in 
the U.S.” 
The question is whether any corporation can claim Second 
Amendment rights to own military-grade cyber weapons as a 
part of the recruitment pool for the state militia and as free men 
with the right to bear arms.  
 
1) Citizens enter a social contract by bearing arms 
 
The argument put forward in this manuscript is that only a 
corporation that risks corporate death and demonstrates 
unquestionable loyalty to the United States could claim Second 
Amendment rights to own military-grade cyber arms. A 
corporate death is the dissolution of the corporation and 
liquidation of assets, often through a non-restructuring 
bankruptcy. If a corporation is large enough to survive and 
sustain operations after a failed cyber engagement, it cannot 
have Second Amendment rights to access military-grade cyber 
weapons. Therefore, any larger corporation would be a US 
person, but would not meet the criteria to bear arms under the 
Second Amendment. The larger corporation is not a part of the 
social contract between the framers of the Bill of Rights and, at 
the time, the political leadership of the United States of America 
and its states, as well as the citizens of those states. The large 
corporation could instead be seen as a rich landowner who 
wants to arm his subordinates and workers, creating a private 
army within the nation-state, and not embody a militiaman. The 
government could entrust larger corporations to own and utilize 
military-grade cyber weapons, but ownership is based on a 
unilateral decision by the government and is not founded on the 
Second Amendment.    
   
2) Those who bear arms are loyal to the United States of 
America 
 
Loyalty to the United States of America is a qualifier for the 
right to bear arms, and if not expressed at the individual level, 
then a corporation that forms a smaller militia would not gain 
the right to own cyber weapons unless its loyalty to the state is 
unquestionable. The Second Amendment to the US 
Constitution reads as follows: “A well-regulated militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people 
to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.” The militia is, 
according to the framers of the Bill of Rights, “necessary to the 
security of the free state.”  A defender and provider of security 
to the free state must be loyal to the state. Otherwise, the right 
to bear arms would provide a right to arm loyalists to the 
English Crown, and in the context of contemporary America 
any group that wants to overthrow the American government or 
support enemies of the state, as well.       
In 1791, the United States had only eight years earlier 
emerged as a free nation liberated through a rebellion against a 
former colonial power that lasted seven years. The American 
  
Revolution split families and communities. Friends became 
enemies as colonists chose either to join the revolution or to 
support continued British rule of the 13 colonies as loyalists to 
the Crown.  
The framers of the Bill of Rights sought to protect the people 
from what they saw as oppression under British rule. In the 
Second Amendment, a prerequisite is an unquestionable loyalty 
to the newborn nation and its states. The right to bear arms is 
reserved only for those loyal to the new republic. The Bill of 
Rights catalogs what the rebellious colonists considered wrong 
with British rule and provided remedies to protect the rights of 
the people of the new republic from abuse, tyranny, and absence 
of the rule of law. The rationale for the Bill of Rights is that it 
provided a legal foundation for securing the freedom and liberty 
gained through the American revolution. As an example, the 
Third Amendment reads as follows: “No soldier shall, in time 
of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the 
owner, nor in time of war but in a manner to be prescribed by 
law.” The Third Amendment is a safeguard against the British 
practice of quartering soldiers in civilian homes without 
providing compensation or seeking homeowners’ consent.    
Similarly, the Fourth Amendment states: “The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” The 
Fourth Amendment protects against the British practice of 
arbitrarily and without any factual support conducting searches 
and seizures of colonists’ property and dwellings. The Fourth 
Amendment introduces probable cause as a threshold for 
government intervention.  
Larger corporations fail to meet the mortal requirement in the 
social contract between the militiamen and the state, and also 
fail to meet the loyalty requirement because they operate and 
have ties with foreign countries; therefore, larger corporations, 
and especially multinational corporations, have no Second 
Amendment right to own or use military-grade cyber weapons.  
Therefore, only smaller, non-multinational corporations that 
can fail and be forced to dissolve and liquidate as a result of a 
cyber engagement can claim the right to own and use military-
grade cyber weapons under the Second Amendment. 
VII. PROHIBITION OF ZERO-DAY EXPLOITS 
A zero-day exploit is a vulnerability that is unknown to 
anyone except its discoverer [15]. The IT industry, the computer 
security community, and the defense establishment are unaware 
of the vulnerability. After the zero-day exploit is found, a tool 
could be designed to take full advantage of the exploit.  
This zero-day exploit tool could be “dangerous and unusual,” 
but still is permissible to own based on the fact that the exploit 
the tool is targeting is unknown to the government. In any 
country that has submitted to the rule of law and democratic 
foundations, the government cannot ban and criminalize what it 
doesn’t know or create all-encompassing penal codes for such 
scenarios.     
A government is unaware of a zero-day exploit and until the 
utilization of the zero-day exploit, not only the exploit is 
unknown, but also the extent of the effects and damage created 
by its exploitation. A tool that exploits zero-day exploits could 
only be prohibited after execution. 
VIII. THE CASTLE DOCTRINE  
The scope of this paper is cyber arms in the light of the 
Second Amendment. In the public discourse, the Second 
Amendment and the Castle Doctrine tend to part of the same 
discussion. The Castle Doctrine has also been used as an 
argument to support legalization of corporate hack back [16]. 
The Castle Doctrine is a common-law doctrine [17] that 
supports the individual’s option, without prosecution or 
penalty, to use force in defending his residence and family. If 
attacked, there traditionally has been an obligation to retreat to 
avoid bodily harm and risk to human life. The Castle Doctrine 
supersedes the obligation to retreat if the attack occurs in the 
personal realm that the doctrine covers based on state-level 
precedence. In some states, the doctrine extends to an 
individual’s vehicles and workplace. The Castle Doctrine’s 
lineage extends to older English common law, under which a 
citizen was considered to have a right to peace and safety in his 
own home. The Second Amendment and the Castle Doctrine 
are separate; where the Second Amendment is the federal right 
to bear arms, the Castle Doctrine is state-level legislation to 
define the boundaries between excessive force, the obligation 
to retreat, and the use of lethal force to defend one’s life and 
property. The Second Amendment right to own and bear arms 
does not provide a right to protect life and property using deadly 
or significant force. Therefore, any citizen’s utilization of 
military grade cyber weapons owned and procured under the 
rights given by the Second Amendment to protect himself from 
physically harmful cyber attacks is contingent not only on 
federal legislation as exemplified by the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (CFAA)[18], but also by state legislation. As our 
society merges human ability and physiology with digital 
mechanisms and initiates a broader use of digital-human 
enhancement, creating a personal attack surface for digital 
arms, the question of a cyber Castle Doctrine is a useful analogy 
from the non-digital reality.       
IX. CONCLUSION 
Currently, there is no cyber Second Amendment case of the 
first impression on the docket. Such a case would trigger a legal 
development and clarification, but already a distinct legal 
doctrine is visible. According to the inquiry, the citizenry has 
the right to own and operate cyber arms under identical 
conditions as firearms. The current US legal doctrine states that 
“unusual and dangerous” arms can be prohibited. The majority 
of the hacking, network discovery, and information systems 
probing and exploiting tools are of military utility and value as 
enablers of cyber capacity even if in civilian hands [19]. 
Therefore, these tools cannot be considered unusual in the light 
of the Second Amendment.  
The question then becomes whether these cyber arms are 
dangerous. The legal doctrine has developed an allowance for 
  
prohibiting dangerous weapons that would harm the public 
beyond an intended military use or that lack safeguards such as 
intent by arming and using the weapon. The labeling of a 
weapon as “dangerous” would require that a cyber weapon 
autonomously initiate attacks without any human interaction, as 
intent is not required when the weapon is assessed on its own 
merits, and this is not applicable to the vast majority of cyber 
weapons. An example of what could be considered dangerous 
could be software that autonomously attacks other information 
systems at the bootup of a networked computer. The software 
has no controlled harm creation, but instead—without any 
intent at the moment of engagement, nor human control—starts 
attacking other systems. Such software could be prohibited.   
The current Second Amendment doctrine would not exclude 
cyber arms unless these arms are of no military value or not 
suitable for military use, or require no intent to be dangerous for 
the general population. The Second Amendment protects 
individual ownership of cyber arms, and to a degree corporate 
ownership, and the case for government intervention and 
prohibition of cyber arms faces significant constitutional 
limitations to be a realistic policy option.    
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